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1 Introduction 
1.1 Subject and Structure of the Thesis  
The subject of the thesis is the application of human rights in situations of military 
occupation, with particular emphasis on the right to liberty and security of person, and the 
right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment1 The subject is chosen 
because allegations of violations of those rights are frequent in such situations, regardless 
of time and place of the conflict. An objective is to see to what extent the mentioned rights 
may be restricted in such emergency situations.  
 
Situations of military occupation, and comparable situations, pose particular problems with 
respect to human rights. Violations of human rights are regretfully a necessary 
consequence of military occupation, as observed by John Dugard, the Special Rapporteur 
of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian 
territories2  
 
Sadly, these are not rare situations, even today. Over the last 50 years, examples may be 
found throughout the world, for instance in Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Tibet, Kurdistan, 
Cyprus, and Western Sahara.3 The present situations in Afghanistan and Iraq may also be 
mentioned in this connection, even though the territories are considered to administer 
themselves. The most evident example of military occupation, however, is the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
 
                                                 
1 Hereafter, ill-treatment is used as a common term for torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
2 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in 
the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, 29.8.2002, paragraph 2. Such reports are hereafter 
referred to as reports of John Dugard. 
3 Some of these situations have now been stabilized, so that violence and violations of human rights no longer 
occurs on a regular basis, e.g. in the case of Northern Ireland. 
 2
The term military occupation is in a strict sense used for situations where a state has 
occupied, partially or entirely, the territory of another state or a non-self-governing 
territory, and places the territory under authority of its military forces. This usually 
concerns rather recent events. 
 
However, the term may also be understood in a wider sense, to include situations that no 
longer are considered a conflict between two independent parties. This may be the case 
when the occupation or annexation of the territory took place a long time ago, and the 
situation has lasted for so long that the territory in question now is considered to be a part 
of the occupying or annexing state(s). In these situations, the official status of the situation 
is particularly disputed. This is the case in several of the examples mentioned above, like 
Chechnya and Tibet. The population of the territory, or at least a part of its population, 
considers the territory to be occupied, and desires to be liberated from the State to obtain its 
independence. The State, on the other hand, tends to consider those who want secession to 
be terrorists, as the struggle for independence often includes more or less armed resistance, 
and in any case conflicts with the interests of the State, who wishes to keep the territory 
under its control.  
 
It is the latter sense of military occupation that is used in this thesis, because whether the 
particular situation is internationally considered an occupation or not, the factual situation 
remains more or less the same; a State in control of a territory where the population (at 
least parts of it) considers itself to be occupied by this State and fights for secession. This 
approach permits to look into and compare several conflicts of the same nature, regardless 
of the official label attached to them. In all cases, no matter the status of the situation, it 
concerns a territory’s struggle for liberation and independence.4 
 
Thus, the situation involves an occupant State, and one or several groups of resistance from 
the population of the occupied territory. The two sides are in armed conflict, and they tend 
                                                 
4 Hereafter, territory includes both territories where most of the population wants independence (like 
Palestine) and territories where only parts of the population want independence (like Northern Ireland).  
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to blame the other party of illegitimate actions, while justifying their own and revenge the 
actions of the other. Instead of reaching a solution to the conflict, they are caught in a 
vicious circle of violence.  
 
The civilian population is the primary victim of the situation. It is often directly affected by 
the military actions of both sides. In addition, the protection of their human rights is 
sacrificed to security needs. It has been suggested that human rights instruments do not 
apply in occupied territories, both because the conflict takes place outside State territory, 
and because the situation concerns an armed conflict in which the application of 
humanitarian law excludes that of human rights law. These arguments have repeatedly been 
rejected by the ICJ. In chapter three, a presentation of when and where human rights are 
applicable is given. 
 
Most of the rights protected in international human rights instruments are to some extent 
violated in situations of military occupation. Even the most basic rights, like the right to 
life, and the right not to be subjected to torture, are violated on a relatively large scale. 
Other frequent problems are the practices of discrimination, destruction of property, 
collective punishment, internment, expulsion, and violations of the rights to freedom of 
expression, movement and assembly.  
 
This thesis discusses the rights not to be arbitrarily detained and not be subjected to ill-
treatment, and the practices concerning these rights These rights are two of the most 
fundamental human rights, concerning individuals’ physical integrity, which make the 
subject especially important. They are also closely linked together, as the person concerned 
is subjected to torture or other ill-treatment subsequent to being detained. The rights 
protected are presented in chapter four, and the practices concerning them are looked into 
in chapter six. 
 
Because it concerns an armed conflict, it is internationally recognized that the belligerent 
occupant does have legitimate security needs. The security needs must, however, be 
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balanced against the legitimate humanitarian needs of the people in the occupied territory. 
Some human rights treaties have derogation clauses, which permit to suspend some of the 
rights in time of public emergency5 Also, the wrongfulness of an action or practice may be 
precluded on the basis of a ground called state of necessity, which is a ground recognized 
by customary international law. These grounds may justify infringements of the rights 
protected for the sake of public security The principles of distinction and proportionality 
play a key role in the consideration of what security measures may be permitted. These 
grounds for derogation are presented in chapter five. 
 
Today, the question of to what extent a State’s need for security may impair the protection 
of the individual’s human rights, is of great present interest. It has especially been brought 
into discussion after the focus on the fight against terrorism, and there are varying opinions 
as to which considerations that have the greatest weight. These questions are briefly looked 
into in chapter seven. 
                                                 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, European Convention on Human Rights art. 15, 
American Convention on Human Rights art.27. (The African Charter on Human Rights does not contain a 
general derogation clause) 
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1.2 Definitions and Delimitations 
1.2.1 Human Rights 
Human rights may be defined as the law that deals with the protection of individuals and 
groups against violations of their internationally guaranteed rights, and with the 
promotion of these rights.6 These rights have been called the birthright of all human beings, 
and the protection and promotion of them as the first responsibility of Governments.7 
Human rights law imposes fundamental exigencies to and limitations to the power of the 
State in relationship to the individual. The rights are guaranteed by international, binding 
treaties. 
 
A challenge of human rights law is to ensure compliance with the treaties. There is no 
authoritative organ to enforce implementation. In case of non-compliance by a State, the 
State will only be exposed to political sanctions and disapproval 
 
1.2.1.1 Historical Background 
Human rights law forms a branch of public international law. Under traditional public 
international law the States were the only subjects, with legal rights and obligations 
towards each other. The individual had no place in this system. It was an object rather than 
a subject of international law, with no rights or obligations.8 This changed with the 
introduction of international humanitarian law and human rights law.  
 
The modern development of humanitarian law began earlier than that of human rights, with 
the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the 19th century.9 
However, the development of both branches of law seriously progressed after the 
                                                 
6 Buergenthal, Shelton, Stewart, p. 1 
7 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 
8 Møse, p. 31 
9 Buergenthal, Shelton, Stewart, p. 20. 
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experiences of the two World Wars. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 of 10 
December 1948 was a major breakthrough in human rights law. It was followed by the two 
Covenants of 1966 that entered into force in 1976. These are the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, with additional protocols. Together, the Declaration and the two 
Covenants form the so-called International Bill of Human Rights. Regional human rights 
instruments have been elaborated in Europe, America and Africa, which more or less 
correspond with the global system of the UN. These are general conventions, dealing with 
a large number of rights.  
 
In addition to these general instruments, specialized conventions have been elaborated 
concerning particular subjects. Examples are the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (7.3.1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (18.12.1979), the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (20.11.1989), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10.12.1984). 
 
These instruments are designed to protect the individual against state abuse, both from the 
state of the individual’s nationality and any other state. They give the individual 
internationally guaranteed rights that to a certain extent may be invoked, and by this, the 
individual has become a subject of international law. 
 
Human rights law obliges the State to ensure and protect certain fundamental rights of the 
individual. Thus, protecting the individual’s human rights is a state responsibility. The 
responsibility has been extended to a personal responsibility for the gravest violations 
(crimes) of human rights with humanitarian law, thus transforming the individual into a 
subject with responsibilities under international law as well. This may be illustrated by the 
practice of the two ad hoc11 International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia12 
                                                 
10 Hereafter called the Declaration.  
11 An ad hoc tribunal is established for the purpose of dealing with a particular subject only. 
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and Rwanda,13 and the recently established International Criminal Court,14 whose purpose 
is to prosecute individuals of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
 
1.2.1.2 The Relationship Between Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law 
International Humanitarian Law may be defined as the human rights component of the law 
of war.15 It applies in international armed conflicts. In certain limited circumstances, it also 
applies in internal armed conflicts. It is designed to protect persons who do not or no longer 
can take part in armed hostilities. The principal sources are the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 with two additional protocols of 1977. Other sources are earlier treaties, like the 
Hague Regulations,16 and various rules of customary international law. Humanitarian law 
has to a great extent been codified in treaties. These rules reflect the most universally 
recognized humanitarian principles, and indicate the normal conduct and behaviour 
expected of States17  
 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are among the treaties that codify principles of 
humanitarian law, and they are today considered to have the status of customary 
international laws. They are therefore binding to all states, also to those that have not 
ratified the treaties. The Geneva Law (The Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949) 
protects the victims of war, aiming to provide safeguards for disabled armed forces 
personnel and persons not taking part in the hostilities18 
 
The two cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian 
law are the principles of distinction and proportionality. The principle of distinction is 
aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, and establishes the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the 
                                                                                                                                                    
12 ICTY was established by Resolution 827 on 25.5.1993, by the UN Security Council. 
13 ICTR was established by Security Council Resolution 955, on 8.11.1994. 
14 The Statute of the ICC was adopted in Rome on 17.07.1998, and entered into force in April 2002. 
15 Buergenthal, Shelton and Stewart, p. 315 
16 See 1.2.2.2. 
17 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para 82 
18 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para 75. 
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object of attack. The principle of proportionality prohibits causing unnecessary suffering to 
combatants. It is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or 
uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that second principle, States do not 
have unlimited freedom of choice of means, for instance in what weapons it uses.19 
 
An interesting question in this context is whether or not the application of international 
humanitarian law would exclude the application of human rights instruments Some states 
have suggested that human rights conventions are directed to the protection of human rights 
in peacetime, and that questions relating to human rights in hostilities are governed 
exclusively by the law applicable in armed conflict, i.e. humanitarian law. This was 
suggested in statements given to the ICJ concerning both the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 
1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, and the Advisory Opinion 
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, of 9 July 2004.20 In both cases, the argument was rejected by the Court. The 
Court stated that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case 
of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions of derogation of the kind found in 
Article 4 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights.21 
 
The ICJ then observed that there are three possible situations with regard to the relationship 
between human rights and humanitarian law: Some rights may be exclusively matters of 
humanitarian law, others exclusively matters of human rights law, and yet others may be 
matters of both branches. 22 The latter is the case in armed occupation. Human rights law 
continues to apply, and since it concerns an armed conflict, humanitarian law is also 
applicable, as lex specialis.23 The two branches of law thus intertwine in these situations.  
 
                                                 
19 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para 78 
20 Hereafter called the Advisory Opinion on the Wall. It is presented in 1.3. 
21 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para 106. 
22 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para 106. 
23 Lex specialis is a rule of interpretation that presumes that specialized rules precede general rules in case of 
conflict, because the former are more adapted to the specific situation. 
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In hostilities, the test of what is e.g. an arbitrary detention, then falls to be determined by 
the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. 
In hostilities, the limits for what is permitted are usually wider than in peacetime, because 
of the particular circumstances of the situation. Thus whether a particular detention is to be 
considered an arbitrary detention contrary to Article 9 of the Covenant, can only be decided 
by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the 
Covenant itself24 Consequently, humanitarian law is used for interpreting the contents of 
human rights provisions. 
 
1.2.2 Military Occupation 
1.2.2.1 Characteristics 
The general characteristics of military occupation are in short given above (see 1.1). Such a 
situation contains elements of armed conflict - the need to maintain law and order, to 
protect the security of the occupant’s armed forces, and actions against groups of resistance 
- and elements of peace - the cessation of hostilities in the occupied area and the setting up 
of a military government in place of that of the local sovereign.25 
 
The status of the conflict is often disputed, as the Occupant State wants to classify it as an 
internal conflict to maintain the greatest extent of control over the situation, while the 
entire, or parts of the population claims they are illegally occupied by a foreign state. This 
is, for instance, the case when the occupation took place a long time ago, and the territory 
now is considered a part of the state. An example of this is Chechnya, which after several 
decades of hostilities, was finally conquered by Russia in the 19th century. In 1991 
Chechnya declared its independence, but has not achieved the status of a sovereign state 
because it lacks the necessary international recognition. In this thesis, the term military 
occupation is used in its wider sense, to include situations where a particular territory 
within a state is fighting for secession from this state.  
                                                 
24 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para 25. 
25 Cohen, p. 284. 
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1.2.2.2 The Hague Regulations Article 42 
The Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Fourth 
Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, fixed the rights and duties of belligerents in their 
conduct of operations and limited the choice of methods and means of injuring the enemy 
in an international armed conflict They were prepared to revise the general laws and 
customs of war existing at that time. However, the International Tribunal of Nuremberg 
later found that the rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilised 
nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war.26 The ICJ 
has reached the same conclusion in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons.27 In the Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the Court repeated this 
view, by stating that the provisions of the Hague Regulations have become part of 
customary law28 This was also recognized by all the participants in the proceedings before 
the Court in this case. Hence, the provisions of the Hague Regulations are binding even to 
states that have not ratified the Convention. 
 
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations defines when a territory is considered to be occupied: 
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of 
the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority 
has been established and can be exercised. 
 
This implies that the authority of the hostile army must be effective, which is a question of 
fact.29 The territory must actually be placed under authority of the belligerent army; 
organised resistance must have been overcome, leaving the hostile army in control of the 
area, and the invading force must have taken measures to establish its authority.30 Military 
occupation exists from a legal point of view when the territory is in the power and under 
                                                 
26 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para 89. 
27 Para 75. 
28 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para 89 
29 Schwarzenberger, Armed Conflict p 324. This is also supported by the French text’s wording de fait 
30 Schwarzenberger, Armed Conflict p174. 
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the control of the occupant and as long as the occupant has the ability to make his will felt 
everywhere in the territory within a reasonable time31 Application of the legal regime of 
occupation does not depend on whether the occupying Power fails to exercise effective 
control over the territory, but on whether it has the ability to exercise such power.32  
 
1.2.2.3 Distinction: Invasion – Occupation – Conquest 
Occupation – Invasion: Occupation is distinguished from invasion by the fact that the 
occupant actually establishes some form of administration in the territory, while an invader 
does not.33 Oppenheim defines belligerent occupation as invasion plus taking possession of 
enemy country for the purpose of holding it, at any rate temporarily.34  
 
Occupation – Conquest: Sections 353 and 358 of the US Army Field Manual (1965) 
distinguish between conquest and belligerent occupation thus: occupation implies that the 
sovereignty of the occupied territory is not vested in the occupying power. Occupation is 
essentially provisional, while conquest implies a transfer of sovereignty, which generally 
takes the form of annexation and is normally effected by a treaty of peace35  
 
Occupation is thus a situation that falls between the cases of invasion and conquest. It is 
more stabilized than an invasion, with the occupying State’s intent of holding the territory 
and the introduction of an effective administration, but it is not permanent like a conquest 
and no sovereignty is transferred. 
 
                                                 
31 See Cohen, p. 16 with further notes. 
32 This principle was affirmed by the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg In re List and Others (the Hostages 
Case) in 1948, and has been reaffirmed since. See e.g. Report of John Dugard, 4.10.2001. 
33 Oppenheim, p. 434. 
34 Oppenheim, p. 434. 
35 Cohen, p. 17. 
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1.2.3 Delimitations 
The subject of this thesis is thus the application of human rights in situations of military 
occupation as defined above, so that humanitarian law will not be discussed in particular. It 
focuses on the protection against arbitrary detention and ill-treatment provided for in the 
ICCPR and the ECHR. 
 
1.3 The Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, of 9 July 2004. 
The request for the Advisory Opinion was made by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. The immediate events leading to the request originated in the United Nations 
Security Council, when a draft resolution, condemning as illegal the construction of the 
wall, was rejected as a result of negative votes from a permanent member on 14 October 
2003. Subsequently, the matter was brought before the Tenth Emergency Special Session 
of the General Assembly. On 27 October 2003, the General Assembly adopted resolution 
ES-10/13, demanding Israel to stop and reverse the construction of the wall During a 
meeting on 8 December, resolution ES-10/14 requesting the Advisory Opinion was 
adopted. 
 
First, the ICJ considers if it has jurisdiction to give an opinion in this case, and confirms 
that it has. Thereafter, the Court considers if there are any compelling reasons for it to use 
its discretionary power not to give an advisory opinion. According to its Statute Article 65, 
the Court may give an advisory opinion. This has been interpreted to imply that the ICJ has 
a discretionary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even though the conditions of 
jurisdiction are met.36 The Court observes that it should in principle not decline to give an 
advisory opinion,37 given its responsibilities as the principle judicial organ of the UN38 and 
                                                 
36 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 14. 
37 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para. 44.  
See also Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
First Phase (ICJ Reports 1950, p. 71), and the Advisory Opinion on Differences Relating to Immunity from 
Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, para 29. 
38 See the UN Charter Article 92. 
 13
that giving an advisory opinion on request represents its participation in the activities39 of 
the UN. In accordance with its consistent jurisprudence, only “compelling reasons” should 
lead the Court to refuse its opinion.40 Considerations of judicial propriety may lead to 
compelling reasons not to give an opinion. This may be the case if the State concerned does 
not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court, 41 or if the Court does not have sufficient 
information before it. Neither of the examples was found applicable in the present case, and 
the question will not be discussed further because of the extent of the thesis 
 
Many of the States submitting written statements to the Court concerning this case were of 
the opinion that the Court should decline to give the opinion. The reason that most of them 
mentioned, was that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a very difficult situation, and they 
were concerned that an advisory opinion relative to it would disturb, halt or completely ruin 
the delicate peace process.42 The Court, however, finds no compelling reasons not to give 
an advisory opinion in this case, and mentions that it has never declined to respond to a 
request for an advisory opinion based on judicial propriety. When the Court in 1996 
declined to give one on Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict, it was because of the Court’s lack of jurisdiction.43 
 
After giving a definition and delimitation of the question posed to it in the request, a 
description of the historical background and of the wall, the Court moves on to determine 
the applicable law. Here, it finds that the application of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law is not mutually exclusive, as suggested by certain states.44 The Court then 
looks into the effect the wall has for human rights of the population in the occupied 
territory, and finds that Israel is in breach of several of its obligations under the applicable 
provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.  
                                                 
39 ICJ Reports 1950, p. 71 
40 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para 44. See also Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155 and the Advisory Opinion on Differences Relating to Immunity from 
Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, para 29. 
41 See the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara for a discussion of this ground.  
42 For example, this was the opinion of Norway. (See written statement of Norway). 
43 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para 44 
44 See section 1.2.1.2 for this discussion. 
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The Court moves on to discuss if these breaches may be justified on grounds of self-
defence on basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, but finds that the Article is not relevant in 
the present case because Israel does not claim that Palestine qualifies as a State. Nor may 
Israel invoke a state of necessity to justify the construction of the wall, as the Court finds 
that this is not the only means to safeguard her interests against the peril invoked. Thus the 
Court concludes that the construction of the wall and its associated regime are contrary to 
international law. Finally, the Court examines the legal consequences resulting from the 
violations of international law, for Israel, other States, and the UN respectively. 
 
This thesis will, as mentioned, discuss the application of rules and practices concerning 
detention and ill-treatment in custody. The Advisory Opinion does not discuss these 
particular aspects of human rights, as the construction of the wall does not affect them. The 
relevance to this thesis lies primarily with the discussion of general applicability of human 
rights instruments in situations of military occupation, with respect to territorial application 
and the relationship to humanitarian law. 
 
Advisory opinions are not, as such, legally binding. But they are judicial pronouncements 
of a judicial institution empowered to interpret and apply the human rights instrument. The 
authoritative character of the legal principle enunciated will thus not be diminished because 
it is pronounced in an advisory opinion and not in a contentious case.45 
                                                 
45 Buergenthal, Shelton, Stewart, pp. 270-271. 
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2 Sources of Law 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned above, human rights law forms a branch of public international law.  
Two fundamental principles of public international law are the principles of sovereignty 
and consent These imply that states are free to do whatever they want within their 
territories, they are not subdued to the authority of anyone else, and they are not bund by 
anything they have not consented to. The Permanent Court of International Justice stated  
in the Lotus case that restrictions upon the independence of States cannot . . . be presumed, 
and that  States have a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules.46 The State may choose to limit it sovereignty by consenting to it in a 
treaty. However, the sovereignty of the State may also be limited by customary 
international law. This constitutes an exception to the principle of sovereignty, implying 
that the State may also be bound by rules that it has not expressly consented to.  
 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ lists the basic sources of public international law. It is 
not intended as an authoritative and limited list of pertinent sources or as a list identifying 
the sources by rank, but rather as directions for the ICJ of what sources it may apply in its 
decision-making process.47 Generally, treaties and customary law48 are considered to be the 
highest sources, because these are the only grounds that may create binding commitment of 
a State, thus international rules. Customary law will not be discussed further (although the 
unwritten customary rules contain some principles in human rights law) because treaties 
enjoy the greatest practical significance.49 Some customary rules are codified in 
                                                 
46 PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, pp. 18 and 19 
47 Ruud, Ulfstein, Fauchald, p.16 
48 Article 38(1)(a) and (b). 
49 Møse, p. 26. 
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conventions, and some of the most fundamental rights protected in the human rights 
conventions grow to achieve the status of customary rules. 
 
The other sources mentioned are general principles of law,50 and as subsidiary means 
judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations.51 These become more or less elements of interpretation of the two primary sources 
when those are not sufficiently clear. The classification of judicial decisions as subsidiary 
means only implies that the system of precedence differs from the strict rule of precedence 
in the Anglo-American common law.52 In practice, they enjoy a great importance in 
defining the contents and meaning of the treaty texts.  
 
In human rights law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has a particular 
importance, even though it is not a binding treaty53 It has had a great influence as 
inspiration for binding conventions on human rights, for instance the two UN Covenants of 
1966, and the European Convention on Human Rights Today it is commonly recognized 
that the Declaration reflects general principles of law and that it creates or at least reflects 
some legal obligations for the Member States of the UN54 The practices of the Human 
Rights Committee,55 other human rights bodies and the case-law of international courts 
(like the ICJ or the European Court of Human Rights) have a major importance in 
interpreting the contents of the rights protected. 
 
2.2 Treaties 
International conventions are mentioned as the first source of international law, in Art. 
38(1)(a). They are considered to be the principal sources of law, because they clearly 
                                                 
50 Art. 38(1)(c). These are fundamental principles common to the states’ internal law.  
51 Art. 38(1)(d). 
52 Ruud, Ulfstein, Fauchald, p 28.  
53 It was elaborated by the UN Commission on Human Rights, and adopted by the UN General Assembly as a 
resolution on 10 December 1948. 
54 Buergenthal, Shelton and Stewart, pp. 39 and 43. 
55 Expressed through its General Comments, its comments to State reports, Concluding Observations, its 
practice concerning individual petitions and its views resulting from these cases. 
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express in writing what the State has chosen to comply with. To have binding force, they 
have to be ratified by the state. A general feature of human rights treaties is that they are 
autonomous; meaning that the terms used in the conventions are interpreted independent of 
other treaties or national laws. The ICCPR and the ECHR are subject for discussion in this 
thesis. I have included an outline of the specialized UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
to illustrate the importance attached to the protection against torture 
 
2.2.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The ICCPR was adopted on 16 December 1966 by the UN General Assembly, and entered 
into force in 1976. Now there are 154 Parties to the Covenant, out of 191 Member States of 
the UN. The ICCPR contains provisions of several civil and political rights, for instance the 
right to life, the right to liberty and security and the right not to be subjected to torture. It 
also has a derogation clause that permits a State Party to suspend all but seven of the most 
fundamental rights in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.56 
Article 4 is discussed more thoroughly in chapter 5.  
 
Compared to the Declaration, the ICCPR is more specific of the rights proclaimed, stronger 
in its statement of obligation to respect the rights specified, and better provided with 
measures of review and supervision. The Covenant established a Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) with various functions designed to ensure the implementation of the Covenant by 
the States.57 The State Parties are obliged to submit reports to the Committee on the human 
rights situation in their territories and measures adopted to ameliorate any present 
problems58 The Covenant provides an optional inter-state complaint system that allows for 
a State Party to charge another with violations of the treaty, on the condition that both 
states have recognized the Committee’s jurisdiction to receive such complaints. 59 Several 
                                                 
56 Art. 4. 
57 Art. 28. 
58 Art. 40 
59 Articles 41-43. 
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states have done so, but the remedy has not yet been resorted to.60 An Optional Protocol of 
16.10.1966 provides a mechanism for individual communications. 
 
2.2.2 The European Convention on Human Rights 
The decision to draft the ECHR was made after the UN adopted the Declaration, when it 
became clear that would take a long time before agreement to transform the Declaration 
into binding treaty obligations could be reached. The human rights system established by 
the European Convention is today the oldest and most effective of those currently in 
existence.61 The Convention was adopted by the Council of Europe62 on 4.11.1950, entered 
into force on 3.9.1953, and has been ratified by 45 States Monaco has signed, but not yet 
ratified it.63 
 
The Convention guarantees certain core civil and political rights, which to a large extent 
correspond to rights protected by the ICCPR, such as the right to life, to liberty and 
security, the prohibition of torture etc. It also contains a derogation clause similar to that of 
the ICCPR.64  The enforcement of the states’ obligations under the Convention is 
supervised by the permanent European Court of Human Rights.65 
 
The Convention ensures obligatory inter-state and individual complaints mechanisms, 
which the states accept by ratifying the treaty. However, before any communication may be 
directed to the Court, the conditions in Art. 35 must be met. For instance, all available and 
effective domestic remedies must be exhausted,66 and the application cannot be manifestly 
                                                 
60 Møse, pp. 137-138, Buergenthal, Shelton, Stewart, p. 57. 
61 Buergenthal, Shelton, Stewart, p. 139. 
62 The Council is a regional intergovernmental organization created in 1949, with the purpose of promoting 
the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The organization has its seat in Strasbourg, and 
has two principal organs: The Parliamentary Assembly (the deliberative organ), and the Committee of 
Ministers (the executive organ). 
63 www.coe.int 
64 Article 15 is discussed in chapter 5. 
65 Art. 19. The permanent Court was established due to a reform of the system in 1998. 
66 Art. 35(1). Møse, p. 126. 
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ill-founded67 The judgements of the Court are binding. The Committee of Ministers 
supervises the execution of the Court’s judgement. 
 
The ICCPR and the ECHR protect many of the same rights, and are similar in many ways. 
The greatest difference is that the European Convention provides a much more efficient 
system of enforcement than the Covenant, containing obligatory inter-state and individual 
complaints and stronger mechanisms of enforcement and sanctions. Complaints involving 
European states will therefore usually resort to the European instruments. The 
communications to the European Court are usually individual complaints. Inter-state 
communications are less common, because states are reluctant to accuse other states of 
human rights violations, as this could lead to diplomatic difficulties.68 
 
2.2.3 The CAT 
This convention was adopted on 10.12.1984 by the UN General Assembly, entered into 
force on 26.6.1987, and has been ratified by 140 states. The CAT defines torture as any act 
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person for certain purposes, e.g. obtaining information, and states that there are no 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever69 that justify such treatment. It covers torture 
inflicted both by government officials, and by private individuals or groups whose conduct 
is encouraged or tolerated by such officials.70 The State Parties undertake to take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction.71 The CAT establishes a Committee on Torture administering the 
measures of implementation provided for in the treaty; an obligatory reporting-system and 
optional inter-state and individual complaints mechanisms. In addition, the committee may 
undertake investigatory action.72 
                                                 
67 Art. 35(3) 
68 Møse, p.131. 
69 Articles 1(1) and 2(2) 
70 Art. 1(1). See Buergenthal, Shelton, Stewart, p. 88. 
71 Art. 2(1). 
72 See Part II of the Convention.  
 20
 
3 Application of Human Rights Instruments 
The application of human rights instruments in situations of military occupation was 
discussed in the Advisory Opinion on the Wall.73 The ICJ first discussed the argument that 
application humanitarian law excludes the application of human rights law. Then the Court 
moved on to discuss the applicability of human rights instruments outside national territory. 
 
3.1 When are Human Rights Instruments Applicable? 
Generally, states are bound by the treaties they have ratified and international customary 
law. If a state has ratified a human rights instrument, the instrument is applicable. As seen 
above, in 1.2.1.2, human rights law is applicable not only in peacetime, but also in armed 
conflict, where humanitarian law serves as lex specialis The State may, however, derogate 
from certain provisions, which will diminish the protection offered by the convention 
concerning those provisions. 
 
3.2 Are Human Rights Instruments Applicable Outside State Territory? 
The scope of application of the ICCPR is defined by its Article 2(1), which states that each 
State Party …undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant…  
 
The wording can be interpreted as covering only individuals that are within the territory of 
the State and subject to that State’s jurisdiction, reading and as implying cumulative 
conditions. But and may also be understood as implying alternative conditions, covering 
both individuals within the territory, and those outside the territory who are subject to the 
                                                 
73 Paras 102-113. 
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State’s jurisdiction. The ICJ considers that the object and purpose of the ICCPR would 
make it seem natural that the States should be bound to comply with the Covenant’s 
provisions also outside the national territory, because even though the State’s jurisdiction is 
primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory.74  
 
The Court adds that this is also consistent with the constant practice of the Human Rights 
Committee, as the Committee has found that the Covenant is applicable where the State 
exercises its jurisdiction on foreign territory.75 The position of the Committee is confirmed 
by the travaux preparatoires76 of the Covenant, which express that the drafters did not 
intend to permit States to escape from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction 
outside their national territory. The Court finally takes note of Israel’s argument – that the 
Covenant and similar instruments did not apply in the occupied territories – and of the 
respondent view of the Committee, which rejected the position of Israel. The Court thus 
finds sufficient support for the interpretation of Art. 2 implying that the ICCPR is 
applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its 
own territory. 
 
The European Convention does not open for this particular discussion of whether the 
Convention is applicable outside national territory or not, by simply stating in its Article 1 
that the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in … this Convention. 
 
Thus, human rights instruments are applicable outside national territory, if the territory in 
question falls within the State’s jurisdiction. The question then becomes in what 
circumstances a State’s jurisdiction extends to a territory outside its national territory.  
 
                                                 
74 Para 109. 
75 See e.g. Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (52/79) and Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay (56/79), 
concerning arrests carried out by Uruguayan agents in Brazil or Argentina. 
76 The official documents prepared in the process of elaborating a treaty, which may help to interpret the 
meaning of the texts as they often express the intentions of the treaty drafters. 
 22
Jurisdiction is interpreted as a situation of de facto control, not one of de jure exercise of 
governmental powers. The term is functional, not geographical, implying that jurisdiction 
exercised from e.g. a Norwegian embassy on foreign territory may provide grounds for 
complaints against Norway.77 A territory under military occupation falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Occupying State, given the fact that the Occupying State actually has set 
up an administration of the territory, thus exercising its jurisdiction.
                                                 
77 Møse, p. 140. 
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4 Contents of the Rights Protected 
4.1 Introduction 
The right to liberty and security of person and the right not to be subjected to torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment are protected by a variety of human rights instruments. 
This thesis deals with the protection offered by the ICCPR and the ECHR, as mentioned in 
the introduction. Because the extent of the thesis does not permit a detailed account of the 
contents of the rights protected, a general outline is given in sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
4.2 The Right to Liberty and Security of Person 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Detention may sometimes be a necessary means to protect the society from certain dangers. 
Detention is, however, a serious infringement of a person’s liberty and physical integrity, 
and experience show that persons are vulnerable to other human rights violations while in 
custody It is therefore important to prevent arbitrary detention. The right not to be 
arbitrarily detained is affirmed by the Declaration Articles 3 and 9, and protected by the 
ICCPR Art. 9, the ECHR Art. 5 and several other human rights instruments. The protection 
offered by these provisions may be subject to derogation in times of public emergency. 
 
The ICCPR Art. 9(1) and the ECHR Art. 5(1) establish the positive right to liberty and 
security, and the negative – that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary detention, unless the 
law prescribes this There are no exceptions to the right to security, while there are some 
limits to the right to liberty.78  
                                                 
78 Møse, p. 242. 
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Under the European Convention, the right to security does not have an independent 
significance.79 The practice concerning Art. 5 suggests that the term is only applicable to 
situations that concern deprivation of liberty. It is rather a factor in the interpretation of the 
right to liberty.80 Unlike the ECHR, the ICCPR attributes an independent significance to 
the right to security. According to the Human Rights Committee, there are no grounds to 
interpret the term to apply only to situations concerning deprivation of liberty. The right 
implies a duty for the State to take appropriate steps to protect persons against death 
threats, when the State is aware of the situation.81  
 
The right to liberty may, as mentioned, be limited. Here, the ECHR is far more detailed 
than the ICCPR The ECHR expressly gives an exhaustive list of situations when 
deprivation of liberty is justified, in Art 5(1)(a)-(f). The Covenant simply establishes that 
detention or arrest cannot be arbitrary, and that someone may not be deprived of his liberty 
unless national law establishes the grounds and procedure for this. Whether the difference 
in the wording implies a difference in the contents of the protection or not, depends on the 
practice of the treaties, as they are autonomous, and do not depend on the interpretation of 
the other.82 
 
The ECHR Art. 5(2)-(5) and the ICCPR Art. 9(2)-(5) establish further conditions, using 
more or less identical wording. Paragraph 3 and a part of paragraph 2 are only applicable to 
persons against whom criminal charges are brought, but the rest applies to all persons 
deprived of their liberty by detention or arrest. Below, a presentation of the contents of the 
Articles is given. First, the right to liberty is discussed (4.2.2), followed by an outline of 
grounds of detention (4.2.3). Then Paragraphs 2-5 are discussed in separate sections (4.2.4-
4.2.7), treating the ECHR and the ICCPR under each section because of the similarities of 
the provisions in both treaties. 
 
                                                 
79 Møse, p. 242 
80 Møse, p. 242. 
81 Møse, p. 243. 
82 Møse, p. 239. 
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4.2.2 “Right to Liberty” 
According to the wording and practice concerning this term (of both treaties), it is a general 
term covering any deprivation of liberty, whether in criminal cases or in other cases.83 It 
contemplates individual liberty in its classic sense, meaning the physical liberty of the 
person. It aims to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of this liberty in an arbitrary 
fashion84 
 
Mere restrictions upon liberty of movement are not covered by the Articles, and are not 
subject to the conditions for deprivation of liberty laid down in it. A distinction must then 
be made between situations of deprivation of liberty according to Art. 5(1) and other 
limitations of liberty. The European Court of Human Rights has found that the difference 
between restriction upon liberty and deprivation of liberty is a question of degree or 
intensity, and not one of nature or substance85 of the measure in question. In considering if 
this situation constituted deprivation of liberty under Art. 5(1), the Court stated that account 
had to be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner 
of implementation of the measure in question86 
 
In Guzzardi v. Italy, a member of the mafia had been ordered to compulsory residence on 
an island for 16 months, and a number of restrictions were put upon his liberty. For 
instance, he was confined to a small area, he was under constant surveillance, did not have 
any real possibilities to make social contacts, and was liable to punishment by "arrest" if he 
failed to comply with any of his obligations. The Court noted that special supervision 
accompanied by an order for compulsory residence in a specified district does not of itself 
come within the scope of Article 5,87 and that it is not possible to speak of deprivation of 
liberty on the strength of any one of these factors taken individually. But cumulatively and 
                                                 
83 Møse, p. 239, HRC General Comment 8. 
84 Engel v. Netherlands, para 58. 
85 Guzzardi v. Italy, para 93. 
86 Guzzardi v. Italy, para 92. 
87 Para 94 
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in combination88 they may constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Art. 5. 
In this case, violation of the Convention was found, as the measures taken by the State 
could not be justified by any of the sub-paragraphs of Art. 5. 
 
Normal restrictions upon the freedom of movement of the members of the armed forces do 
not constitute a deprivation of liberty according to Art. 5, because of the specific demands 
of military service.89 Penalties of light arrest and aggravated arrest both fall outside of Art. 
5, while the penalty of strict arrest is covered. The latter implies being locked in a cell, and 
the Court has found that it entails a violation of the Convention, as it cannot be justified by 
any of the sub-paragraphs (a)-(f)90 
 
Detention might violate Art. 5 even though the person concerned might have agreed to it. 
The Court has stated that the right to liberty is too important in a "democratic society" 
within the meaning of the Convention for a person to lose the benefit of the protection of 
the Convention for the single reason that he consents to be taken into detention91 
 
4.2.3 Grounds of Detention 
4.2.3.1 ECHR 
According to the ECHR, deprivation of liberty is allowed in 6 specific cases, listed in Art. 
5(1)(a)-(f). These exceptions to the right to liberty are exhaustive and subject to strict 
interpretation according to the European Court’s jurisprudence92 According to the second 
phrase of Art. 5(1), all deprivations of liberty must be in accordance with national law and 
the general principles of the Convention, and not arbitrary. National law refers primarily to 
formal, written law, but practice might also in certain circumstances achieve that status.93 
Whether a particular detention constitutes a violation of the Convention will therefore also 
                                                 
88 Guzzardi v. Italy, para 95. 
89 Engel v. Netherlands, para 59 
90 Engel v. Netherlands, paras 61-63. 
91 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, para 65. 
92 Møse, pp. 243-244. 
93 Møse, p. 244 
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depend on the internal law of the State. If the law does not prescribe detention for a certain 
situation, detention will in that case constitute a breach of the Convention. The European 
Court is cautious in trying the grounds for detention in national law, as the States are the 
primary interpreters and appliers of that law. If national courts have found that the 
conditions of the internal law are satisfied, the European Court will be reluctant to review 
that decision. However, it will react to obvious breaches of national law.94 To not be 
considered arbitrary, the detention has to be in accordance with one of the six sub-
paragraphs of Art. 5(1). 
 
4.2.3.1.1 Art. 5(1)(a) 
This alternative concerns typical cases of detention following a conviction by a competent 
court The limits for what cases fall within this exception are somewhat uncertain, but the 
provision does establish some minimum conditions. Imprisonment on indefinite time is not 
in itself in variance with the Convention, but depends on the particular circumstances of the 
situation.  
 
The Article does not allow so-called preventive detention, i.e. the arrest of someone to 
avoid future offences. In the Guzzardi judgement, the Court stated that conviction implies 
that it must be established in accordance with the law that there has been an offence - 
either criminal or… disciplinary, implying a finding of guilt95  
 
4.2.3.1.2 Art. 5(1)(b) 
The first alternative allows for the detention of persons that are not complying with the 
lawful order of a court, for example witnesses that have a duty to testify in a criminal case. 
The second alternative permits to detain someone if it is necessary to secure the fulfilment 
of any obligation prescribed by law This could be interpreted to allow preventive detention, 
                                                 
94 Møse, p. 244. An evident breach of the Convention might be that there are no legal grounds for the 
detention, and the State authorities recognize this, or if it obvious for other reasons. 
95 Para 100. 
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but it has been established by the European Court that it is not the case. This provision is 
applicable only with the purpose to compel a person to fulfil a specific and concrete 
obligation which he has until then failed to satisfy96 A wide interpretation would entail 
consequences incompatible with the notion of the rule of law from which the whole 
Convention draws its inspiration97 
 
4.2.3.1.3 Art. 5(1)(c) 
On certain conditions, detention may be used in the course of criminal prosecution. Under 
any circumstances, the purpose of the deprivation of liberty must be to bring the detainee 
before the competent legal authority. This term refers to the same legal authority that 
according Art. 5(3) shall exercise judicial control with the deprivation of liberty carried out 
according to Art. 5(1)(c).98 It is sufficient that the authorities intended to bring the person 
before the legal authority at the time of the arrest.99  
 
Sub-paragraph c establishes three alternative grounds for detention. Alternative one 
requires that there must be a reasonable suspicion against the detainee for having 
committed an offence, amounting to a probability of over 50% This implies that there must 
be facts or information sufficient to convince an unbiased third party that the accused has 
committed the particular offence. Reasonable suspicion must exist at the time of the arrest, 
and as long as the person is detained.100 
 
Alternative two permits the detention of a person when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent his committing an offence It does not provide a legal basis for 
preventive detention. This was first established in the case of Lawless v. Ireland, where the 
Court found that detention without actual intent to bring the detained before a competent 
legal authority was a violation of the Convention. Lawless was suspected of being a 
                                                 
96 Engel v. Netherlands, para 69.  
97 Engel v. Netherlands, para 69. 
98 Møse, p. 252. 
99 Møse, p. 253. 
100 Møse, pp. 253-254. 
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member of the IRA, and was held in custody for five months. This was in accordance with 
national law, but not with Art. 5(1)(c) of the Convention.101  
 
As a rule, the Article does not provide grounds for the re-detention or continued detention 
of a person who has served a sentence after conviction of a specific criminal offence where 
there is a suspicion that he might commit a further similar offence.102  
 
The third alternative allows detaining a person when it is considered necessary to prevent 
his fleeing after having committed an offence. These cases will normally fall within the 
scope of the first alternative. This suggests that the alternative’s significance is primarily in 
the consideration of whether continued custody is in conformity with Article 5(3) of the 
Convention. 
 
4.2.3.1.4 Art 5(1)(d) 
This sub-paragraph permits the detention of minors on strict conditions. Generally, internal 
law sets the standard of who is considered to be minor, although the term has an 
autonomous core.103 This exception to the right to liberty must also be seen in the light of 
the Convention on the rights of the Child. 
 
4.2.3.1.5 Art. 5(1)(e) 
Certain groups may also be lawfully detained. This concerns for instance alcoholics, 
vagrants or persons spreading infectious diseases. The sub-paragraph sets no maximum 
limit to the period of time the persons falling within these groups may be detained, thus 
making the provision of judicial control in Art 5(4) especially important in this regard. 
 
                                                 
101 Lawless v. Ireland, para 48. In this case, the Court concluded that because of the derogation clause in Art. 
15, the particular detention did not entail a violation of the Convention after all. 
102 Eriksen v. Norway, para 86. 
103 Møse, p. 255. 
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4.2.3.1.6 Art. 5(1)(f) 
The exception to the right to liberty established in this sub-paragraph concerns situations 
where the authorities need to apply detention as a means of controlling illegal immigration, 
or where an offender is detained with the view of deporting or extraditing him, pending the 
demand of extradition.  
 
4.2.3.2 ICCPR 
Art. 9 does not contain an exhaustive list of when detention is permitted. There are two 
general, cumulative conditions for lawful deprivation of liberty under the Covenant.104 One 
is the requirement that any deprivation of liberty must be on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law. Whether law implies that 
statutory rules are needed, or if administrative rules are sufficient, has not been clearly 
established, but practice points to the latter.105  
 
The other condition is that the detention cannot be arbitrary. The practice of the HRC has 
established that arbitrary does not only refer to unlawful detention, but also implies 
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability106 Cases of abductions or 
“disappearances,” as well as arrests made solely on political grounds have been found to 
constitute arbitrary deprivations of liberty.107  
 
Deprivation of liberty must be reasonable and necessary, for instance to prevent fleeing, 
further similar offences or the destruction of evidence,108 similar to the ECHR Art. 5(1)(c). 
Being applicable to all deprivations of liberty, the ICCPR Art 9(1) may also cover cases of 
mental illness, vagrancy, drug addiction, educational purposes, or immigration control,109 
                                                 
104 Møse, pp. 260-261. 
105 Møse, p. 261. 
106 See Møse, p. 261 with further notes. 
107 Møse, pp. 242 and 261 with further notes. 
108 See Møse, p. 261. 
109 HRC General Comment 8. 
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which is similar to the ECHR Art. 5(1)(e)-(f). This suggests that some of the considerations 
that are made under the European Convention are pertinent under the Covenant as well. 
 
4.2.4 The Right to Information 
4.2.4.1 ECHR 
Art. 5(2) applies to all cases concerning deprivation of liberty.110 The Article ensures the 
right of a detainee to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the 
reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. The purpose is to provide an efficient 
possibility for the detainee consider the lawfulness of the arrest and to demand judicial 
control of it in accordance with Art. 5(4). 
 
In Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK, the Court established some general conditions to the 
information, stating that the information must be given in a simple, non-technical language 
that he can understand and of the essential legal and factual reasons for his arrest111 The 
Court also pronounced that promptly do not require all information to be given in its 
entirety at the very moment of the arrest Whether the content and promptness of the 
information conveyed were sufficient must be assessed in each case according to its 
special features.112 The Court found in the Fox case that a matter of a few hours was within 
the constraints of time imposed by the notion of promptness. 12 days have been accepted in 
one case, while a period of 10 days was considered a violation of the Convention in 
another.113  
 
The Fox case concerned several persons arrested on suspicion of terrorism. At the arrest 
they were informed that they were arrested and charged according to one particular legal 
provision, indicating the legal basis for the arrest. During the interrogation, it was revealed 
what specific criminal acts they were suspected of. The Court concluded that at the time of 
                                                 
110 Van der Leer v. Netherlands, paras 27-28. 
111 Para 40. 
112 Para 40. 
113 Møse, p. 263. 
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the arrest the information was insufficient, but that it was amended through the police 
interrogations.114 Thus, the crucial point is whether the information is brought to the 
attention of the detainee to enable him to understand why he is arrested, within a 
reasonable period of time.  
 
4.2.4.2 ICCPR 
The wording of the corresponding provision in the Covenant Art. 9(2) differs from the 
ECHR in two respects: It does not expressly state that the information must be given in a 
language the detainee understands, and it distinguishes between the information of the 
reasons for the detention (that has to be given at the time of the arrest) and the information 
of any charges brought against him (that has to be given promptly).115 In many cases before 
the HRC, violation of this article has been found, but these are usually cases where no 
information has been given116 However, it has been established that anyone detained has 
the right to be sufficiently informed to take appropriate steps to be released if he considers 
the arrest to be invalid. This corresponds with the ECHR117  
 
4.2.5 The Right to Rapid Procedure 
The ECHR Art. 5(3) and the ICCPR Art. 9(3) contain conditions for rapid procedure in 
cases of criminal investigation The application of the Articles to criminal cases exclusively 
follows from both the wording and practice concerning the Articles.118 First, arrested 
persons must be brought promptly before a judge, or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power, for a decision of custody or release. Secondly, detainees are 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time, or to release pending trial. 
 
                                                 
114 Fox para 40. 
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117 Møse, p. 264. 
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4.2.5.1 The right to be brought promptly before a judge 
The bringing before a judge to decide on the question of custody must happen promptly.  
Concerning the ECHR, the precedent is the case of Brogan v. UK, where four terrorist 
suspects were arrested and interrogated before they were released without having been 
brought before a judge. The European Court pronounced that the context of terrorism had 
the effect of prolonging the duration of custody permitted under the Article.119 However, in 
this case the limits were exceeded, as the person detained for the shortest amount of time 
was detained for four days and six hours, and the Court found that a period of such duration 
falls outside the strict constraints as to time permitted.120 Thus, there is a strong 
presumption that longer periods also constitute violations of the Convention. Shorter 
periods will be subject to a consideration of the concrete situation.  
 
The officer must have some of the attributes of a judge, that is to say, he must satisfy 
certain conditions each of which constitutes a guarantee for the person arrested121 He must 
be independent of the executive and of the parties. This does not mean that the officer may 
not be to some extent subordinate to other judges or officers if they also enjoy similar 
independence. The procedural requirement obliges the officer to hearing himself the 
individual brought before him. The substantive requirement imposes on him the obligations 
of reviewing the circumstances militating for or against detention, of deciding, by reference 
to legal criteria, whether there are reasons to justify detention, and of ordering release if 
there are no such reasons.122  
 
In its General Comment 8, the Human Rights Committee stated that promptly requires that 
delays must not exceed a few days Practice does not provide any guidelines as to where the 
exact limit goes, as most cases have concerned incidents where the limits of Art. 9(3) 
clearly have been violated123 
                                                 
119 Para 61. 
120 Brogan v. UK, para 62. 
121 Schiesser v. Switzerland, para 31. 
122 Schiesser v. Switzerland, para 31. 
123 Møse, p. 267. 
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4.2.5.2 Trial Within Reasonable Time 
The time span between the arrest and trial must be reasonable. The period of time the 
person is held in custody cannot be too long, or he has to be released. But even if he is 
released pending trial, the trial must be held within a reasonable time The accused must be 
considered innocent until his conviction, and be released when detention no longer is 
reasonable. These principles were established by the European Court in four judgements in 
the late 1960’s.124  
 
Whether the condition of within reasonable time is satisfied depends on the particular 
circumstances of each case. The duration of the detention is estimated from the arrest to the 
time when the detainee is released or convicted in the first instance.125 Continued detention 
is only permitted if the public interest outweighs the respect for the individual’s liberty. An 
absolute condition for continued detention is that there is still a reasonable suspicion 
against the detainee for having committed an offence. However, after a certain time this is 
no longer sufficient alone. Then, the authorities must justify relevant and sufficient reasons 
in addition to the suspicion.126  
 
Factors taken into account in this consideration might be the complexity of the case, the 
conduct of the authorities and the conduct of the accused.127 Practice of Art. 5(3) show that 
what is accepted as being within reasonable time depends on the specific circumstances of 
the situation in question. For example, a time span of 2 years, 1 month and 2 days was 
found to constitute a violation of the Convention,128 while a period of 4 years and 3 days 
has been accepted, because of the complexity of the case and the conduct of the accused.129  
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Unlike the ECCPR, the Covenant Art. 9(3) expressly states that detention in custody of 
persons awaiting trial shall not be the general rule. Pre-trial detention should be an 
exception and as short as possible.130 Art. 9(3) also establishes that release may be 
subjected to guarantees for the accused to appear for trial, and at any other stage of the 
proceedings. The ECHR Art. 5(3) only allows this for appearance for trial.  
 
4.2.6 Judicial control 
Both the ECHR Art. 5(4) and the ICCPR Art. 9(4) require that all persons arrested or 
detained are entitled to take proceedings before a court in order for that court to decide, in 
a certain speed, on the lawfulness of the detention in question. If the detention is unlawful, 
the detainee shall be released Both Articles apply to any deprivation of liberty, whether 
decided by the courts or the executive. These are important guarantees for the purpose of 
the Articles; namely to avoid arbitrary detentions. 
 
4.2.6.1 ECHR 
According to the practice of Art. 5(4), a court does not necessarily have to be a court within 
the regular court system, but also other organs of a judicial nature. Such an organ must 
satisfy the conditions of independence from the executive and the parties, and has to follow 
judicial procedures, for instance respect the fundamental principle of contradiction, 
meaning that all parties to a case should be heard. The organ has to have the power of 
making binding decisions to qualify for the term court within the meaning of the 
Convention. The ECHR does not require an instance of appeals, but if the internal law has 
established such a system, this instance must also satisfy the exigencies of the 
Convention.131 If the detention was decided by the court, the detainee has a right to try the 
decision before the court in reasonable intervals, to consider if the circumstances justifying 
the detention have changed.132  
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The court shall try the lawfulness of the detention. That implies that the court has to assess 
whether the conditions for detention still exist. This assessment is the same as in 5(1), 
considering the lawfulness in the light of domestic law, the Convention, the Convention’s 
general principles, and the purpose of the exceptions.133 The court is not required to try the 
expediency of the detention.134  
 
The Article also demands a certain speed of the proceedings, from when the request for 
release is made to the time when the court gives its decision. The limit of what is 
considered speedily depends on all the circumstances of the particular situation. Relevant 
criteria are similar to those of Art. 5(3). But the exigencies of speed are stricter for Art. 
5(4), especially if it concerns a criminal case.135 In the Fox case, 44 hours did not exceed 
the limits, while cases of 31 and 36 days and more have been found in violation of the 
Convention. However, the Court accepted a period of 17 months in Letellier v. France 
because of the particular circumstances of the case.136 
 
4.2.6.2 ICCPR 
Art. 9(4) is considered by the Committee as an especially important guarantee, applicable 
to all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention.137 The three conditions of the 
Article are the same as for the European Convention, although there is a small difference in 
the wording. While the ECHR uses speedily, the Covenant applies without delay If this 
implies a difference in the application of the Articles, remains to be decided by 
conventional practice. Whether this condition is satisfied depends on an assessment of the 
concrete situation.138 Both 3 and 5 months have been judged unacceptable.139 The 
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proceedings must be before a court. This term includes not only regular courts, but also 
specialized tribunals.140  
 
4.2.7 The Right to Compensation 
ECHR Art. 5(5) and ICCPR Art. 9(5) establish the right to compensation for cases of 
detention in contravention of their provisions.  
 
The HRC stated in its General Comment 8 that if so-called preventive detention is used (for 
reasons of public security) it must be controlled by these same provisions: It must not be 
arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and procedures established by law, 9(1), 
information of the reasons must be given, 9(2), and court control of the detention must be 
available, 9(4), as well as compensation in the case of a breach, 9(5). If criminal charges 
are brought in such cases, the full protection of Article 9(2) and 9(3) and Article 14, must 
also be granted. 
                                                 
140 Møse, p. 289. 
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4.3 The Right Not to Be Subjected to Torture, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Torture, inhuman and degrading treatment are serious violations of a person’s physical and 
mental integrity Acts of torture are not only horrible in themselves, but such abuses have 
terrible long-term consequences, as they destroy the lives of detainees and dehumanize 
interrogators.141 The right not to be subjected to ill-treatment is affirmed in the 
Declaration’s Article 5, and is protected by a variety of treaties, including the ICCPR and 
the ECHR. Several specialized conventions, like the CAT, have also been elaborated to 
enforce the protection against ill-treatment.  
 
The right cannot be subject to derogation in times of emergency, applies to its full extent in 
armed conflict, and no justification may be invoked to excuse violations of it142 It is now 
commonly recognized that the protection against torture has the status of customary 
international law.143 However, allegations of ill-treatment are still frequent, even against 
state parties to treaties obliging them to abstain from the use of such treatment and to take 
positive steps to ensure that it does not occur. 
 
The wording of the ECHR Art. 3 and the ICCPR Art. 7 are similar, although the ICCPR 
contains an additional protection against involuntary medical or scientific experimentation 
The provisions are general, covering a number of situations. Their core field of application 
is infringement of individuals’ physical integrity. The protection against ill-treatment is 
particularly important for persons deprived of their liberty, as individuals are vulnerable to 
such treatment in custody The aim of the provisions is to protect both the dignity and the 
physical and mental integrity of the individual. 
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143 Møse, p. 207. 
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4.3.2 ECHR 
The European Convention Art. 3 prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct.144 The wording 
does not itself qualify the term torture, and the case-law has not established any exhaustive 
definitions of what situations it applies to. However, practice has clarified the relationship 
between the terms torture, inhuman or degrading treatment145 The treatment in question 
must satisfy a certain minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Art. 3. The 
assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, e.g. 
the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age 
and state of health of the victim146 The distinction between the terms derives principally 
from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted147  
 
The most severe cases qualify as torture. The European Court has qualified torture as 
deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering Treatment causing 
intense and mental suffering to the person, or leading to acute psychiatric disturbances 
during interrogation qualifies as inhuman treatment, whether actual bodily injury is 
inflicted or not. The least severe cases fall within the scope of the term degrading 
treatment, covering treatment that arouses feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable 
of humiliating and debasing, and possibly breaking the victim’s physical or moral 
resistance.148 If the treatment does not qualify for any of these, it might constitute a 
violation of Art. 8; the right to private life.149  
 
In Ireland v. UK, the Court found that the combined use of five particular techniques for 
hours at a stretch during so-called interrogation in depth constituted inhuman and 
degrading treatment, but did not amount to torture150 These techniques included forcing 
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detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a “stress position” (described as being 
spreadeagled against the wall; with their fingers put high above the head against the wall, 
the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight 
of the body mainly on the fingers), hooding, subjection to a continuous loud and hissing 
noise, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink151  
 
The Article implies a burden of proof for the authorities. If a person in their custody has 
been injured, and the authorities cannot provide a plausible explanation of how that 
happened, they are presumed responsible for the injuries.152 The authorities are strictly 
liable for the conduct of their subordinates; they are under a duty to impose their will on 
subordinates and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure that it is respected.153 
 
The Court has pronounced that the use of force not strictly necessary to handle the 
detainee, in itself reduces the human dignity, and thus violates Art. 3.154 Art. 3 also implies 
an obligation to investigate arguable claims of serious abuse by the police or other 
authorities, with the aim of finding and punishing those responsible. If the investigation is 
not sufficiently efficient, it entails a violation of Art. 3.155 
 
In cases of deprivation of liberty, the physical conditions of the detention may entail a 
violation of Art. 3.156 Solitary confinement is not in itself in variance with the Convention. 
Whether the confinement is acceptable depends on a consideration of the particular 
circumstances of the situation. Relevant criteria are, e.g. the duration, purpose and 
conditions of the detention, and the effects on the detainee.157 
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4.3.3 ICCPR 
Like the ECHR, the Covenant Art. 7 does not define the terms torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. The distinction between the three depends on the nature, purpose and 
severity of the treatment applied.158 Many complaints have been decided by the Committee, 
but usually it just establishes that there has been a violation of the Article, without 
specifically mentioning which of the terms were applicable to the case.159 
 
Torture was found in Bazzano, Masssera and Others v. Uruguay, (107/1981), where a 
person had been forced to stand, wearing a hood, for several hours so that he fell and broke 
his ankle. He was also beaten and given electric shocks. Inhuman and cruel treatment was 
found in Tshiekedi v. Zaire, (242/1987) where the detainee was deprived of food and drink 
for four days. Degrading treatment was found in Polay Campos v. Peru, (557/1994), where 
a revolutionary leader had been displayed to the press in a cage. 
 
The Article is applicable to acts causing physical pain, and to acts causing mental suffering 
to the victim. The prohibition extends to corporal punishment, including excessive 
chastisement ordered as punishment for a crime or as an educative or disciplinary 
measure.160 Prolonged solitary confinement of the detainee may amount to acts prohibited 
by article 7161 Deprivation of liberty pending execution of the death penalty (death row) is 
not in itself in variance with the Covenant.162 But the conditions under the custody might 
lead to a violation, and the execution must be carried out in such a way as to cause the least 
possible physical and mental suffering.163  
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The prohibition in Art. 7 is complemented by the positive requirements of Art. 10(1) which 
stipulates that: All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.164  
 
Under the ECHR and ICCPR alike, a decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive 
may engage the conventional responsibility of that State where substantial grounds have 
been shown for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to 
ill-treatment in the requesting country.165 
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5 Derogation 
5.1 Introduction 
Some rights protected by human rights instruments may be subjected to derogation by 
conventional derogation clauses in time of public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation. There is also a correspondent, independent ground for preclusion of the 
wrongfulness of an action or practice, recognized by customary international law, called 
state of necessity It arises where there is an irreconcilable conflict between an essential 
interest on the one hand and an obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other.166  
State of necessity will not be treated in particular because the extent of the thesis is limited 
to the ICCPR and the ECHR A brief outline is given below, before derogation clauses are 
discussed in 5.2. 
 
State of necessity is codified in Article 25 of the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It can only be 
accepted on an exceptional basis, and can only be invoked under certain strictly defined 
conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied. The main condition is that the measure in 
question must be the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril The State concerned is not the sole judge of whether those 
conditions have been met.167  
 
An interesting question in this context is the relationship between state of necessity and 
treaties with qualifying clauses or derogation clauses Again, the extent of the thesis has no 
room for this discussion. In the Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the ICJ found that it did not 
                                                 
166 ILC Commentaries to the Draft Articles 
167 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, para 51 
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need to consider that question. However, common conditions for state of necessity and 
derogation clauses are that the means applied must be strictly required by the exigencies of 
the particular situation, and the principle of proportionality must be respected. 
 
5.2 Derogation Clauses 
The ECHR Art. 15 and the ICCPR Art. 4 provide grounds for derogation in times of 
emergency. However, the measure of derogation and its material consequences are 
subjected to a specific regime of safeguards for the purpose of preventing the abuse of a 
State’s emergency powers.168 
 
5.2.1 Requirements to the situation 
Not every national emergency qualifies to permit derogation. The situation has to be of a 
serious nature, and will often be an event which is of concern to the international 
community in terms of maintenance of peace and security. 
 
5.2.2 Requirements to the measures 
Permitted derogations must be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation, which reflects the principle of proportionality.169 The measures taken must be 
the least intrusive means amongst those which may achieve the desired result. The 
objective of the derogation must be the restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect 
for the Covenant can again be secured, and measures are only permitted to the extent 
absolutely necessary to achieve that goal. The Human Rights Committee stated in its 
General Comment 29, concerning Art. 4, that this requirement relates to the duration, 
geographical coverage and material scope of the state of emergency and any measures of 
derogation resorted to 
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Also during an armed conflict are measures derogating from the Covenant allowed only if 
and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation. Measures 
derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary 
nature170 Furthermore, the measures applied may in no circumstances be inconsistent with 
the State’s other obligations under international law, whether based on treaty or general 
international law.  
 
Both the ECHR Art. 15(2) and the ICCPR Art. 4(2) list some non-derogable rights, like the 
right not to be subjected to torture. However, this does not imply that other articles in the 
treaties may be subjected to derogations at will. A careful analysis under each article based 
on an objective assessment of the actual situation must be conducted, because of the legal 
obligation to narrow down all derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.171 There are elements that cannot be made subject to lawful derogation under 
Article 4.172 If a derogable provision expresses a norm of general international law not 
subject to derogation, that element prevails. An example is ICCPR Art. 10(1) that requires 
that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person Though not mentioned in Art. 4, this provision is 
considered to have the status of a non-derogable element. The HRC finds support for this 
conclusion by the reference to the preamble to the Covenant and by the close connection 
between articles 7 and 10. 
 
That status may also be obtained in order to protect non-derogable rights. For instance, the 
right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of detention must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from 
the Covenant173 
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5.2.3 Obligation of Notification 
Both the ECHR Art. 15(3) and the ICCPR Art. 4(3) oblige the State to inform the 
international community when it takes measures derogating from its conventional 
obligations. The State must justify its decision to proclaim a state of emergency and any 
specific measures based on such a proclamation. 
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6 Practices of Detention and Ill-treatment 
6.1 Introduction 
Detention and ill-treatment in custody seem to be frequently resorted to in situations of 
military occupation The occupying state often labels resistance groups of the occupied 
territory are terrorists to justify actions against those groups as anti-terrorism operations. 
Detention is viewed as preventing a potentially greater threat to the wellbeing of the State 
and its peoples. The motivation may also be to strike down on opposition, by silencing, 
controlling or intimidating political opponents. Ill-treatment is often applied to obtain 
information from detainees or suspects, although such abuses are absolutely prohibited by 
universally agreed-upon standards. Some governments justify such treatment as inevitable 
in the global war on terrorism.  
 
There is no room for an in-depth study of practices of detention and ill-treatment in this 
thesis, so the discussion will be quite general, and mostly based on reports of NGOs. Thus, 
the thesis cannot provide any exhaustive conclusion as to the extent or contents of such 
practices, but will merely give an outline of some practices reported of.  
 
Three areas are chosen: The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Chechnya and Northern 
Ireland. They are chosen because they are conflicts that still exist today, and some of them 
are frequently discussed in the media. They are also the ones I have found the most 
information on concerning the subject. Three are chosen because it gives the study a 
broader area to contrast and compare, and more easily permit to observe a general practice 
if there is one. Only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is internationally recognized as 
occupation, while the others are considered internal conflicts. However, they are all 
covered by military occupation in its wider sense. The emphasis will be on Palestine, and 
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the discussion on Northern Ireland will be somewhat superficial, as that conflict is less 
acute today, but is included for the geographical spread of the examples 
 
Both the ICCPR and the ECHR are applicable to the cases of Northern Ireland174 and 
Chechnya,175 while only the ICCPR is applicable to Palestine.176 
 
6.2 Detention 
6.2.1 The Occupied Palestinian Territory 
The historical context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of conflict and successive 
wars for over 50 years, prolonged occupation for over 30 years, and a protracted, fragile 
peace process. Israel derogated from the ICCPR Art. 9 upon ratification, and has adopted 
laws allowing various forms of detention. Under certain provisions, detentions may be 
extended indefinitely177 
 
The right to liberty is violated on a large scale by Israeli military interventions in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory.178 Detention is a commonly used measure of the Israel 
Defence Forces to strike down on Palestinian opposition. Every year, thousands of 
Palestinians are detained. Some of them are released without charge shortly after the arrest, 
while others are held without trial or access to a lawyer.179 Thousands are charged with 
security offences. The trials before military courts do often not meet international standards 
of fairness.180 A large number of juveniles are also held in detention for political offences, 
mostly for throwing stones at the Israeli security forces.181 
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Hundreds of Palestinians are held in administrative detention, i.e. detention by 
administrative order rather than judicial procedure, without charge or trial.182 
Administrative detention entails restriction on access to counsel and to the full disclose of 
reasons of the detention, limiting the effectiveness of judicial review, thus endangering the 
protection against torture and other inhuman treatment. The Human Rights Committee 
considers these measures to derogate from Art. 9 more extensively than what is permissible 
pursuant to Art. 4.183 
 
Sometimes, detention is applied as a collective punishment. For instance, during the 
assaults on Palestinian towns in March and April 2002, all males between 16 and 45 were 
detained in several towns. Most of them were held for several days, regardless of the 
personal responsibility of those arrested, while those not released were held without trial or 
access to a lawyer184 Prolonged detention without any access to a lawyer or other persons 
of the outside world violates Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14(3)(b), and no one should be held for 
more than 48 hours without access to a lawyer.185 
Human rights activists are often the victims of arbitrary detention. An example is `Abd al-
Latif Gheith, a 63 years old and board chairman of Addameer,186 who was detained after 
security officials questioned him at a military checkpoint about Addameer’s activities and 
staff. After a week, Israel’s deputy military commander issued an order detaining Gheith in 
a military detention camp without charge for six months on unspecified grounds of 
endangering security187 
6.2.2 Chechnya 
In its report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights condemned the human rights situation in Chechnya as 
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catastrophic.188 Acts of terrorism have been committed by Chechen fighters in Chechnya 
and in other parts of Russia. Russia’s federal forces have detained and “disappeared” 
thousands of Chechens suspected of involvement with rebel forces and tortured them in 
custody to obtain confessions and information, considering these actions to be 
counterterrorism operations189 Disappearances, rape, torture and extrajudicial executions 
by federal troops and Chechen fighters are everyday occurrences in Chechnya.190  
 
In most cases, the Russian and Chechen authorities fail to conduct prompt, independent and 
thorough investigation into allegations of human rights violations against the civilian 
population. Since 1999, only one serviceman has served an active prison sentence for 
torture or disappearance in Chechnya.191 National laws have been adopted, extending the 
length of time that someone suspected of terrorism-related offences may be held without 
charge to 30 days, and increasing the maximum sentence for these offences from 20 years 
to life imprisonment192 
 
According to the finds of HRW, disappearances in Chechnya are so widespread and 
systematic that they constitute crimes against humanity. Since 1999, between 3,000 and 
5,000 individuals are estimated to have “disappeared.” Often, their corpses are found in 
unmarked graves or dumped by road sides or elsewhere, but in most cases they are simply 
never heard from after being taken into custody.193   
 
Reports received by Amnesty International, show that many of these abuses take place 
during targeted raids by Russian federal and Chechen forces.194 Forced disappearances are 
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allegedly carried out to conceal the torture and summary execution of those in their 
custody195  
 
The examples are obviously many. One is the raid of the village of Duba-Yurt Military 
vehicles carrying uniformed and masked men entered the village in the middle of the night, 
raiding 19 houses, and detaining 11 men. Three of them were released soon afterwards. The 
bodies of the remaining eight were found a couple of weeks later, several kilometres away, 
reportedly bearing marks of torture and multiple gunshot wounds.196 
 
Human rights defenders and people seeking justice through the European Court of Human 
Rights tend to be harassed, as these people oppose the practices of the State, and let human 
rights violations be known to the world. One example is the case of Anzor Pokaev His 
father and nine others filed an application to the European Court in July 2003 concerning 
the disappearances in April 2002 of their relatives, who included Anzor’s brother Anzor 
was detained about a year later, during a raid in his home allegedly carried out by federal 
troops His body was found at the roadside the next morning bearing several gunshot 
wounds197  
 
Women are increasingly being detained and tortured in order to make them confess to 
cooperating with Chechen armed groups.198  An obvious example of arbitrary detention is 
the case of “Madina” who was detained by Russian federal forces, blindfolded and taken to 
the main Russian military base in Khankala, where she was ill-treated (see 6.3.2) After two 
weeks she was released and told that the officers had made a mistake in detaining her. They 
threatened to kill her if she reported what had happened to her199 
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6.2.3 Northern Ireland 
Over the years, particularly since The Troubles began in 1969, the authorities in Northern 
Ireland have exercised a series of extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention and internment. 
The government has justified these measures as effective means of containing violence in 
order to combat the longest and most violent terrorist campaign witnessed in either part of 
the island of Ireland200  
 
The UK derogated from paragraphs 1 to 4 of Art. 5, and have adopted several acts and 
regulations permitting various forms of detention, enabling the authorities to effect 
extrajudicial deprivation of liberty falling into three basic categories: Initial arrest for 
interrogation, detention for further interrogation (interim custody) and preventive detention 
(detention).201  
 
Some regulations permitted unlimited duration of the detention, and in many cases it lasted 
for some years.202 The detainees were normally not informed of the reasons of their arrest, 
and the possibility of judicial control was often limited203 In 1991, Professor Peter Burns 
(the UN rapporteur for the UK) observed a practice of holding suspects in incommunicado 
detention for 48 hours, extending detention for up to seven days, denying access to 
independent medical examination, and the removal of the right to silence. Furthermore, 
detainees were often denied immediate access to solicitors, were not brought promptly 
before judges or, if charged, brought speedily before a court for adjudication204  
 
Over the years, some thousand individuals have been held in detention and/or charged with 
terrorist-type offences205 Not only persons suspected IRA terrorists were detained, but also 
persons suspected of being involved or associated with the IRA. In some cases persons 
were even detained for interrogation about the activities of others, and persons were 
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arrested or detained on the basis of inadequate or inaccurate information.206 A HRW 
investigation in 1992 showed that quite a few juveniles were detained for some time as 
well.207 Compensation for wrongful arrest or false imprisonment was paid in some cases.208 
 
6.2.4 Observations 
In all three cases, the states have provided domestic legislation to combat terrorism, 
allowing various forms of detentions, and detention extending for longer periods of time, 
sometimes indefinitely Although this legislation is directed to protect the state from 
terrorist actions, reports of NGOs suggest that civilians to a large extent are taken into 
custody and held in detention as well, without adequate grounds Civilians who are vaguely 
connected to, or suspected of having information on alleged terrorists, as well as human 
rights activists, seem to be particularly vulnerable to arbitrary detention. 
 
General features seem to be that detentions are carried out without proper grounds or 
particular suspicion, and that individuals are held in incommunicado detention without 
access to a lawyer or possibility of judicial control within reasonable time. Allegations of 
human rights violation seem to be poorly investigated 
 
Detentions of long durations seem to be a common feature in Northern Ireland and 
Palestine, while disappearances seem to be a particular problem in Chechnya The use of 
detention as collective punishment seems to be a special feature in Palestine.  
                                                 
206 Ireland v. UK, paras 38-41, 81. 
207 HRW, Children in Northern Ireland 
208 Ireland v. UK, para 143. 
 54
 
6.3 Ill-treatment 
6.3.1 The Occupied Palestinian Territory 
The Israeli Supreme Court ruled in September 1999 that six frequently-used practices of 
the Israeli Security Agency violated existing laws. These included beatings, prolonged 
sleep deprivation, covering the head with a sack, violent shaking, painful hackling, and 
prolonged painful positioning.209  
 
In 2002, the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) reported that there 
appeared to be a gradual reversion to the use of torture despite the Supreme Court decision 
outlawing its use. Methods reportedly used during interrogation included the methods 
mentioned above in addition to kicking, deprivation of food and drink, exposure to extreme 
temperatures, unhygienic conditions, and intense psychological pressure.210 Cases where 
the detainees were stripped to their underpants, blindfolded, handcuffed, paraded before 
television cameras and insulted were also observed, as well as subjection to loud noises and 
threats against family members.211  
 
Children detained for stone-throwing were subjected to similar treatment, and were also 
doused with cold water in winter, shot at with toy pistols with plastic pellets from close 
range and having their heads placed in the toilet while the toilet was flushed.212 
 
According to Israeli human rights activists and defence lawyers, the techniques outlawed 
by the 1999 ruling are now used less frequently, but have been replaced by techniques that 
are extremely stressful psychologically.213 These techniques include greater isolation for 
longer periods, denial of access to lawyers and family members for extended periods, 
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prolonged interrogation sessions, use of collaborators to threaten detainees, and threats to 
family members. Interviews by HRW of former detainees showed that physical violence, or 
the threat of it, is often present in the treatment of detainees.214 Thus, abusive interrogation 
techniques, sometimes amounting to torture, continue to be practiced in Israel This 
conclusion is supported by various NGOs.215 
 
An example is the case of Marwan Barghouti, who was arrested by Israeli security forces in 
2002, and taken to a detention centre. He was allegedly held in incommunicado detention 
for a month. Later he was allowed visits from his lawyers, but not his family. During 
interrogations he was tortured using a method known as shabeh, being forced to sit on a 
small sloping chair, where the front legs are shorter than the back legs, with his hands and 
feet shackled. He was also deprived of sleep, allowed to sleep for only two hours a day 
over a period of 72 hours. In addition, his interrogators made threats to kill him and his son, 
who was held in a prison in Israel.216 
 
Israel tends to invoke the necessity defence argument to justify interrogation techniques 
incompatible with Art. 7. The Supreme Court ruling permits the security agency to claim 
the necessity defence in cases where “exceptional interrogation means” are allegedly 
needed, as in so-called “ticking bomb” cases.217 These are situation in which interrogators 
are said to learn that a terrorist suspect in custody knows where a ticking bomb has been 
planted and must force that information from him to save lives. This argument is not 
recognized under the Covenant.218 
 
Charges of torture and ill-treatment tend not to be adequately investigated. Complaints 
about inhuman treatment are generally not investigated or taken seriously. According to 
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HRW, no Israeli Security Agency or officer has faced criminal or disciplinary charges for 
acts of torture or ill-treatment since 1999.219 
 
6.3.2 Chechnya 
Generally, Russian police routinely uses torture or other ill-treatment to extract 
confessions.220 The treatment of alleged terrorists will then obviously not be any better. 
Investigations into allegations of ill-treatment are rare and often inadequate, thus 
contributing to a climate of impunity.221 
 
As previously mentioned, disappearances are used to conceal ill-treatment. According to 
HRW, the majority of the bodies found subsequent to disappearances, showed signs of 
severe mutilation. This mutilation included flaying or scalping, severed finger tips and ears, 
broken limbs, and close range bullet wounds typical of summary executions. Some of these 
bodies have been examined by medical doctors, revealing that some of the deliberate 
mutilations were inflicted while the detainees were still alive.222 
 
Those who are released from detention report of serious beatings, threats of disappearance, 
electric shocks and various other acts of ill-treatment. A man interviewed by HRW in 
February 2005 reported that during detention he was held on the concrete floor of a tiny, 
unheated cell, handcuffed with a plastic bag over his head the entire time. He had also been 
severely beaten and injected with an unknown drug.223 Women are, in addition, sometimes 
victims of rape, and threats of rape, during detention. For example, “Madina” (see 6.2.2) 
was beaten, subjected to electric shocks every day, stripped naked and sexually abused by 
groups of officers during her detention.224 
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Women are also vulnerable in their own homes. During sweep operations (house-to-house 
searches for Chechen rebels by Russian forces), male relatives often leave their villages for 
safer locations to avoid arbitrary arrest, torture, and disappearances. Left alone without 
protection, many women are subjected to rape and other ill-treatment.225 
 
Ill-treatment is not only inflicted on those individuals suspected of terrorist-related 
offences Also relatives and acquaintances of the wanted persons are subjected to such 
treatment. For example, over 80 relatives of Omar Khambiev, a former Chechen Minister 
of Health, were rounded up from various parts of Chechnya by the Kadyrovsty.226 They 
were reportedly tortured and ill-treated for a twofold purpose: First, in an attempt to stop 
Khambiev speaking out about violations in Chechnya. Secondly, to force his brother, a 
leader of a Chechen armed opposition group, to surrender.227 
 
6.3.3 Northern Ireland 
During the period 1971-1975, over two thousand allegations of ill-treatment were 
reportedly made against the police and army228 The ill-treatment included severe beatings 
and kicking, in addition to the combined use of the five techniques mentioned in 4.3.2. 
 
An investigation by HRW in 1991 showed that detainees were still quite frequently 
subjected to severe beatings, threats, insults, spitting, and incarceration in inhumane 
conditions. Minors were also subjected to such treatment.229 However, in April 1992, some 
human rights activists and lawyers reported that they had not received complaints of 
physical abuse from detainees for some months It was suggested that international pressure 
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from international human rights bodies and NGOs had an effect in stopping, at least 
temporarily, such physical abuse.230 
 
The HRW investigation also showed that harassment of minors by security forces in the 
streets was very common. Persons under the age of 25 were often stopped by the army or 
police and subsequently hit, kicked, threatened, insulted and humiliated. Some were 
ordered to take off their shoes, or even their clothes in the middle of the street231 
 
Police investigation into allegations of ill-treatment was often not carried out232 
Compensation for ill-treatment was paid in some cases.233 
 
6.3.4 Observations 
Widespread practices of ill-treatment have been observed in all three cases, sometimes 
applied to obtain information from the detainee, and in some cases performed as random 
abuse without any particular purpose. General features are severe beatings, kicking, 
hooding, threats of further ill-treatment, threats against family members, and incarceration 
in poor conditions.  
 
The method of painful, prolonged positioning seems to be a common feature of ill-
treatment in Northern Ireland and Palestine, although the positions used are not identical. 
The use of electric shocks, and to a certain extent rape and various forms of mutilation, 
seem to be a particular feature of ill-treatment in Chechnya. Police investigation into 
allegations of ill-treatment is often not satisfactory, if carried out at all. 
 
                                                 
230 HRW, Children in Northern Ireland 
231 HRW, Children in Northern Ireland 
232 Ireland v. UK, paras 118, 140-141. HRW, Children in Northern Ireland 
233 Ireland v. UK, paras 107-143. 
 59
 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The Advisory Opinion on the Wall established that human rights instruments are applicable 
in situations of military occupation, in interaction with humanitarian law. This position was 
already taken by most states, the HRC (which had consistently expressed that opinion in 
decisions, Concluding Observations, reports and General Comments), the UN General 
Assembly (expressed through various resolutions), as well as by the ICJ itself, in the 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Even though 
the Advisory Opinion on the Wall might not have entailed a great change of the legal 
situation, it has clarified and reinforced the position taken by repeating and clearly 
expressing it. Thus, the protection of the right to liberty and security and the right not to be 
subjected to ill-treatment apply in situations of military occupation 
 
7.2 Permitted restrictions 
According to the ICCPR and the ECHR, detention is permitted on certain conditions: 
Detention in a particular case must be prescribed by domestic law, it cannot be arbitrary, 
the detainee has a right to information and rapid procedure, and the detention must be 
subject to judicial control. Ill-treatment is, however, prohibited under any circumstances, 
which is emphasised by various human rights instruments. 
 
According to reports, practices in contravention of the mentioned rights are common in 
situations of military occupation, including widespread practices of arbitrary detention and 
ill-treatment in custody. The occupying state often adopts counter-terrorism laws, 
permitting detentions that do not satisfy the conditions of human rights instrument. The 
harassment of human rights activists suggest that sometimes such laws are applied as 
 60
weapons against political opponents, to control or silence them Civilians in general are also 
the victims of arbitrary detention, as the examples in section 6.2 show. There also seem to 
be a widespread practice of ill-treating detainees using various methods, sometimes 
amounting to torture Most common, however, are severe beatings and incarceration in poor 
conditions. 
 
However, the limits for what is permitted in time of emergency are somewhat extended, 
and derogation clauses (and the ground state of necessity) may permit the use of security 
measures that infringe certain human rights in time of emergency. But even these impose 
certain limits to the measures applied: The measures have to be strictly necessary and 
proportionate. Ill-treatment cannot be justified under any circumstances, but a State may 
derogate from the protection against arbitrary detention. This does, however, not mean that 
the State can carry out detentions at will and deprive detainees of all their rights. The right 
to judicial control of the detention, as well as the right to be treated with humanity in 
detention, have been found to constitute a non-derogable element, which cannot be 
diminished by derogation.  
 
Thus, the right to liberty and security of person may be restricted (on strict conditions) to a 
large extent in situations of military occupation, but certain elements prevail even then. 
Restrictions upon the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
are not allowed, even in times of emergency 
 
7.3 Human Rights and the War on Terrorism  
The renewed discussion of how to combat terrorism has brought some to claim that human 
rights must be sacrificed to security needs. This argument is particularly invoked by states 
struggling to maintain control in occupied territories, e.g. Israel and Russia. A growing 
tendency is the use of language defining political opponents, or groups of resistance in 
occupied territories, as terrorists in order to justify measures taken against them, or simply 
discredit their cause  
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States are entitled to take strong action to prevent acts of terrorism, but there are limits on 
the extent to which human rights may be violated in the name of anti-terrorism action, 
some of which have been discussed in this thesis234 The challenge ahead is to maintain 
these limits, and to make states comply with their international obligations under 
humanitarian and human rights law. Human rights bodies and NGOs are consistently 
emphasising the importance of respecting human rights norms. UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan stated in March 2005 that compromising human rights cannot serve the struggle 
against terrorism235 
 
Security measures restricting human rights do not necessarily obtain the purpose of 
protecting the State’s interests Depriving people of their rights and subjecting them to 
abuse will in the long run create feelings of resentment and anger, and if pushed too far, it 
may lead the people to take desperate measures directed against the State The State may, in 
turn, take measures against those acts, and so the conflict escalates The pattern has been 
detected in situations of military occupation, where observers have seen that it also entails 
less obvious consequences harming the occupying state. As expressed by the Israeli 
parliamentary speaker in 2002: The jailer and his prisoner are locked up for most of the 
day behind the same walls and without hope … occupation corrupts236 
 
It seems like the conclusion reached by John Dugard, that the promotion and protection of 
human rights is the most effective method of combating terrorism, may be true.237 
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